Britain – Ilhan Kyuchyuk.eu
Britain – Ilhan Kyuchyuk.eu
The UK government went into the renegotiation harbouring a legitimate concern that the Eurozone may act as a block within the EU, using its majority in the EU Council to pass laws, primarily for its own interests. As a result, financial regulations could be imposed on the City making it less globally competitive, thereby hurting a key UK economic interest. Lastly, there were the demands surrounding individual rights. This is because the right of EU citizens to move to the UK became inherently politicized as part of a broader debate over immigration — a subject absent from the 1975 EEC referendum. The author reported that the Great Britain denied access to in-work benefits to recently arrived jobseekers from elsewhere in the EU, despite it was discriminatory.
Transformation of Political Values in the EU: Pros and Cons. The Papers of the “Round-table” Debate of the Lecturers and Students of Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia
It was repeated in the speech of the new Prime Minister T. May, who replaced D. Cameron. “Unlike other European countries, we have no written constitution, but the principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty is the basis of our unwritten constitutional settlement. We have only a recent history of devolved governance — though it has rapidly embedded itself — and we have little history of coalition government”.
La Chine est de plus en plus influente sur la scène internationale, selon Tony Blair
But if China’s leaders were as sophisticated as they claim, they would behave very differently. Personally I think Bexit could’ve gone fine for the UK if they had a coherent and realistic plan for the negotiations. London has as much to offer continental interests (a conduit for independence from regulation) as the EU has to offer the UK in return.
Brexit could in fact breathe new life into this stalled alliance by creating momentum for a new EU initiative as a show of defiance to British Euroscepticism. But reticence of the French President’s to discuss Brexit is not attributed to ideological hostility by the author. Rather, the cause lay in France’s twin economic and political weakness, which “hampers its ability to guide the future course of European integration”29.
EU heads of states and leaders of EU institutions were equally taken aback by this unprecedented reverse for European integration. A decade after the Great Recession, Europe’s economy is still convalescing, and another period of prolonged hardship would cause serious, potentially dangerous economic and political damage. With monetary and fiscal policy unlikely to provide enough stimulus, policymakers should explore alternative options. that we do not seem to come to an agreement in what shape or form such a European unification can work.
- Its author, the British researcher, the senior lecturer of the chair of politics and international relations of Aston University, A. Glenkross prepared substantial, but not deprived of flaws the research within short limits of time.
- Cameron’s achievements31.
- A. Glenkross highlights concept of “British exceptionalism” and confirms his argument by the UK refusal from euro, the Schengen agreement as well as by the determination to leave from the European ideal “of ever closer union”12.
“The Prime Minister now in the UK, like David Cameron, like myself, and before that, I mean, we are all in favor of a strong British relationship with China. Even if we go ahead with Brexit, I still think the Chinese relationship will be very important to us. It’s an economic relationship, but it should also should be a political relationship. I supported the government when it joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. I think One Belt One Road is one of the most important things that’s going to be happening in the world in the next 20 years. I think it’s important that we participate as far as we can in that. So the relationship between Britain and China should carry on being a strong one and indeed strengthen, whatever happens with Brexit,” he said. A. Glencross states that on a strategic level, UK’s withdrawal from the EU has a number of important ramifications, many of them potentially favourable to French interests. France’s permanent UN Security Council seat could gain a new legitimacy as the voice of the EU on the international stage.
A. Glenkross assumes that D. Cameron was confident of winning the referendum on the basis of a pragmatism and bean-counting evaluation. However, the public opinion “was out of step with the government cost — benefit argument” and “David Cameron’s gamble proved a great miscalculation”4. The author ranks the 2016 referendum amongst the major political blunders of British Prime Ministers which caused shock waves across Europe and North Atlantic. The decision to delegate responsibility to the people ended up costing him his position as Prime Minister.
Pro-EU positions were deemed risky and mainstream parties on the left and the right shied away from articulating a clear and forceful defence of the EU integration. This became more symptomatic in the UK where Eurosceptic positions became the norm and pro-EU politicians were self-censoring, being marginalised or ridiculed, especially by the dominant right-wing press. Brexit is primarily an opportunity to reconfigure European sovereignty around shared citizen interests, not solely EU Corporate interests.
The absence of a British presence in the EU’s decision-making bodies would make trade and regulation policy more protectionist in line with the instincts of French брексит дата governments of both Left and Right. Lastly, a British departure would make the Franco-German tandem once again the be-all and end-all of European integration.
But it seems internal politics is blocking agreement on national policy, resulting in the default path of a “hard brexit” or crash-out. I don’t claim to understand the politics behind that result. Unfortunately, this was the reflection of an evolution of political discourses during the last брексит новости 20 years when mainstream political forces stopped defending the European project. After the end of the Cold War there was less urgency in supporting solidarity and cohesion in the West, which enabled nationalists to go unchallenged and set the agenda for the discussions about the EU.
Glenkross agrees with the false opinion of the historian R. Granieri5, which regards the choice made by British voters as anti-EU, because “at no time has Britain actively sought to undermine an organization https://www.maximarkets.org/ within which it was already a member”6. Moreover, he recognizes unexpectedness of the result for the academics because “there are no navigational charts for the course that now needs to be plotted”.
However, it is not conceivable for the UK to complete new trade deals until it has formally left the EU and clarified its terms of access to the single market35. In the fourth chapter “The EU Referendum https://www.maximarkets.org/brexit/ Campaign” the author characterizes D. Cameron’s tactic which proved to be effective in 1975 referendum. At that time the British government emphasized economic gains from EEC membership.